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Abstract
In a Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol, a user can download a file from a database without revealing
the identity of the file to each individual server. A PIR protocol is called t-private if the identity of the file remains
concealed even if t of the servers collude. Graph based replication is a simple technique, which is prevalent in both
theory and practice, for achieving erasure robustness in storage systems. In this technique each file is replicated on two
or more storage servers, giving rise to a (hyper-)graph structure. In this paper we study private information retrieval
protocols in graph based replication systems. The main interest of this work is maximizing the parameter t, and in
particular, understanding the structure of the colluding sets which emerge in a given graph. Our main contribution
is a 2-replication scheme which guarantees perfect privacy from acyclic sets in the graph, and guarantees partial-
privacy in the presence of cycles. Furthermore, by providing an upper bound, it is shown that the PIR rate of this
scheme is at most a factor of two from its optimal value for an important family of graphs. Lastly, we extend our
results to larger replication factors and to graph-based coding, which is a similar technique with smaller storage
overhead and larger PIR rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent data breaches in major corporations have emphasized the need for privacy in the digital era. Among
the many challenges that designers of distributed storage systems face is the ability to support private information
retrieval (PIR) protocols. These protocols enable the end user to retrieve an entry of the database, while concealing
the identity of that entry from the servers. This paper studies PIR protocols in a particular common type of distributed
storage systems.
Coding for storage systems has developed tremendously in recent years. However, many system designers
still favor replication techniques, over more involved ones, as a means to guarantee robustness against hardware
failures [5, 12]. In spite of having high storage overhead and low failure resilience, replication is often preferred
due to its simplicity of implementation. In addition, various types of replication systems are studied in theoretical
research due to their real-world impact and ease of analysis [9, 18, 19, 29, 30]. However, since contemporary
datasets are far too large to be stored on one machine, it is usually the case where every machine stores a small
number of selected files from the dataset, each of which is replicated among geographically separated machines.
In turn, such systems can be modeled as hypergraphs, where nodes represent storage servers and (hyper-)edges
represent files. In these graphs, an edge is incident with a node if a copy of the respective file is stored on the
respective server. Storage systems which broadly adhere to the above outline are called graph-based replication
systems. A graph based replication system in which every file is replicated r times is called an r-replication system,
and r is called its replication factor.
One of the most important metrics by which PIR protocols are measured is their collusion resistance. In its most
simplistic form, a PIR protocol must guarantee perfect privacy against every individual server1. That is, it should
be computationally impossible for every individual server to infer any information regarding the identity of the
requested file. The term collusion resistance measures the ability of a PIR protocol to perform beyond this baseline.
That is, what is the maximum number of servers that still remain completely oblivious to the identity of the file,
even if collusion among them is permitted. Traditionally, the term “collusion” stems from a mindset which considers
Parts of this work were presented at the International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Vail, CO, USA, 2018.
1In some settings, only computational privacy is required, but this paper focus exclusively on perfect privacy.
2the servers themselves as adversaries. Yet, the authors of this paper deem this interpretation obsolete, since it does
not align with contemporary storage services. Instead, one can think of geographically separated servers as having
independent security protocols, that must be individually broken by an adversary. In this case, the term “colluding
servers” refers to a set of servers whose security was breached by an outside adversary, that can therefore observe
their input and output. Normally, the term t-privacy of a given protocol indicates the maximum number of servers
that cannot infer any information regarding the identity of the file even if they collude; and in our alternative
viewpoint, t + 1 is the minimum number of individually-secured servers that must be breached by an adversary
in order to infringe the perfect privacy of the protocol. Nevertheless, in our choice of terms we comply with the
standard nomenclature.
PIR protocols have been studied extensively in the past years, and many additional metrics of interest were
defined. Among the metrics of interests are: (a) the PIR rate, which measures the ratio between the size of the
desired data and the size of the downloaded one; (b) the upload complexity, which measures the size of the queries
that are sent to the servers; and (c) the storage overhead, which measures the amount of redundancy in the system.
While our main concern is understanding the collusion resistance of the system, we also address some of these
metrics in our analysis.
In this paper we initiate a study about PIR protocols in graph based replication systems, and our primary focus
is studying their collusion resistance. Since such systems are inherently non-uniform, in the sense that every server
stores a different part of the dataset, one might expect that the collusion resistance will act accordingly. Indeed, our
results show that the right viewpoint for analyzing colluding sets is not their size, but rather the structure of their
induced subgraph. In particular, perfect privacy is maintained if the colluding sets do not contain certain sub-graphs.
Our results shed light on the design of such systems in a bilateral manner. On one hand, we provide recom-
mendations for system designers regarding the file dispersion in the system. On the other hand, we provide a way
for analyzing the collusion resistance of a given system. In particular, we provide a PIR protocol for 2-replication
systems and show that its PIR rate at least half of its optimal value in many cases of interest. For larger replication
factors we provide a simple scheme whose collusion resistance is less than the replication factor, and another
scheme which obtains a larger collusion resistance by a reduction to the two 2-replication case.
Further, we suggest an alternative graph-based coding approach, in which every file is coded by using an MDS
code, and the resulting codeword symbols are dispersed as in graph-based replication systems. While this approach
reduces the storage overhead and increases the PIR rate, it requires a careful file dispersion in order to guarantee
high collusion resistance. The results in this paper, and graph-based coding in particular, call for future research
and practical implementations, that would hopefully bring the vast PIR literature closer to realistic storage systems.
This paper is structured as follows. Preliminaries and previous works are discussed in Section II. Protocols and
bounds for 2-replication systems are given in Section III, and larger replication factors are discussed in Section IV.
Then, graph-based coding is discussed in Section V, and open problems for future research are discussed in
Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For a prime power q let Fq be the field with q elements. In a PIR protocol (not necessarily a graph-based one),
a dataset X = (x⊤1 , . . . , x
⊤
n )
⊤ ∈ Fn×fq , which consists on n files {xi}ni=1, is stored across s storage servers in a
possibly coded manner. The user wishes to download the file xφ, where for the sake of the probabilistic analysis, φ
is seen as uniformly distributed over [n] , {1, 2, . . . , n}. To this end, the user uses randomness in order to generate
queries q1, . . . ,qs, one for every server. In turn, server i replies with ai, that is a deterministic function of qi and
the server’s content. The protocol is called t-private if for every subset T ⊆ [s] of size at most t,
I({qj}j∈T ;φ) = 0,
where I denotes mutual information. Alternatively, the protocol is t-private if {qj}j∈T and φ are independent.
Finally, the PIR rate of the system is f/
∑
i∈[s] |ai|, i.e., the ratio between the size of the desired data and the
amount of downloaded one, both measured in Fq symbols.
In a graph-based replication system every file is replicated multiple times and each one of the copies is stored on
a different server. If all files are replicated an identical number of times r, we say that it is an r-replication system,
and r is its replication factor. In a 2-replication system a graph structure arises, in which nodes represent servers,
3edges represent files, and an edge is incident with a node if the respective file is stored on the respective server.
Similarly, in r-replication systems for r > 2 an r-uniform hypergraph2 structure arises, and in systems where every
file is replicated a different number of times, a non-uniform hypergraph arises. Notice that for r = 2, a multigraph3
might arise, in cases where there exist two servers that share more than one file in common. While our analysis
does not exclude these cases, they result in poor collusion resistance and impede the overall message. Therefore,
we restrict our attention to systems in which every two servers store at most one file in common (see Remark 7
for further discussion).
Graphs are denoted by G = (E,V ), where E = {e1, e2, . . .} and V = {v1, v2, . . .}. Unless otherwise stated,
all graphs in this paper are undirected, and hence, an edge is a subset of vertices (subset of size two in ordinary
graphs, and of arbitrary size in hypergraphs). For a given graph G′ we denote its set of edges by E(G′) and its
set of vertices by V (G′). Since graphs represent storage systems in this paper, the terms node, vertex, and server
are used interchangeably, and so does the terms edge and file.
For a graph G and a subset S ⊆ V (G) we denote by GS the subgraph induced by S , i.e., the graph which
consists of the nodes in S and all the edges in E(G) that both of their incident nodes are in S . A cycle in G is
a subgraph of G whose nodes are {vi}t−1i=0 for some t, and whose edges are {vi, vi+1 mod t}t−1i=0, and these edges
exist also in E(G). An edge e is said to be incident with a vertex v, and vice versa, if v ∈ e. The set of edges
in E(G) that are incident with v are denoted by ΓG(v), where G is omitted if clear from context. The incidence
matrix I(G) of a graph G is a |V (G)| × |E(G)| binary matrix in which rows correspond to nodes and columns
correspond to edges, and an entry contains 1 if and only if the respective vertex is incident with the respective
edge. In the sequel, the well-known Breadth First Search (BFS) algorithm is used repeatedly, in graphs as well as
in hypergraphs, and the uninformed reader is referred to [7].
In all subsequent protocols, the queries q1, . . . ,qs are vectors in F
n
q , i.e., they contain a field element for every
file. However, since the servers contain only a portion of the files in the system, the user communicates only their
support to the servers. We denote by Q the s× n matrix whose i’th row is qi for every i ∈ [s], and note that it is
a random variable that depends on φ, and on the randomness at the user. In cases where φ is fixed, we denote the
matrix of queries by Q|φ.
Since submatrices are used repeatedly, we define the following notation. For a matrix A ∈ Fs×n and sets S ⊆ [s]
and N ⊆ [n], let AS,N be the submatrix of A that consists of the rows in S and the columns in N . Further,
let A:,N , A[s],N and AS,: , AS,[n]. For vectors a ∈ Fnq and b ∈ Fsq we define aN and bS analogously. For
convenience, we consider the rows and columns of a matrix AS,N as indexed by S and N , respectively, rather than
by [|S|] and [|N |]. For example, if n = s = 4 and S = N = {2, 3}, then AS,N is a 2× 2 matrix whose entries are
indexed by (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 3). Since submatrices of Q are in strong correspondence with subgraphs of G,
for every subgraph T of G (denoted T ⊆ G) we denote QT , QV (T ),E(T ), and similarly, for every vector v ∈ Fsq
we define vT , vV (T ).
By and large, we use lower-case letters (a, b, c, . . .) to denote scalars, boldface letters (a,b, c, . . .) to denote
vectors (all of which are row vectors), capital letters (A,B,C, . . .) to denote matrices or graphs, and calligraphic
letters (A,B, C, . . .) to denote sets. Finally, we use the standard notation [N,K]q to denote a linear code of length N
and dimension K over Fq.
A. Previous work
Originally defined in [6], the PIR problem has attracted a tremendous amount of research in the past two decades;
and due to its tight connection with distributed storage, PIR enjoyed an increasing attention in the past few years.
Since a comprehensive summary of previous works is beyond the scope of this paper, we list herein only a partial
list of recent contributions, and elaborate on the most relevant ones.
The recent surge of interest in PIR, which addresses the problem from a distributed storage standpoint, includes
the reduction of storage overhead by using error correcting codes in [10] and its improvement in [3]; obtaining
secrecy by one extra bit in [17] and its improvement in [4]; and an extensive line of works regarding achievability
and capacity in various scenarios, such as multi-round, multi-message, symmetric, and with byzantine or colluding
2That is, a hypergraph in which all edges contain an identical number of nodes.
3A multigraph is a graph in which a certain edge can appear multiple times. Multiple occurrences of the same edge are called parallel
edges.
4servers [1, 2, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26]. This line of works is a natural extension of an earlier one in the computer
science community, which addressed the problem in a more simplistic fashion. Namely, the dataset is assumed
to be replicated in its entirety on all servers in the system, and the files are assumed to consist of a single bit.
Furthermore, this problem is strongly connected to locally decodable codes [27, 28], and has seen a substantial
progress recently [8].
All of the aforementioned works fall into either one of two extremes in the approach towards PIR. In one, the
dataset in its entirety is stored in every server, and in the other it is coded by using an MDS code. The current
work addresses a sweet spot between the two, that is strongly motivated by real-world applications [5, 12], as well
as a plethora of storage models that were addressed in the past [9, 18, 19, 29, 30].
Nevertheless, two notions that are relevant to this work were recently addressed in the literature. First, one
may consider the special case of graph-based replication in which the degree4 of the nodes in the graph is upper
bounded by some parameter. Evidently, this special case is strongly connected to a recent work [25], that addressed
the general coded PIR question in cases where each server is constrained to contain only a fraction of the entire
dataset. Yet, [25] did not impose the particular replication structure that is fundamental to our approach, and more
importantly, did not consider collusion. Furthermore, we emphasize that our graph-based approach is highly flexible,
in the sense that no constraint is imposed other than every file being replicated on a subset of the servers.
Another notion that was previously studied is that of collusion patterns [13, 24]. In this variant, the system
must guarantee collusion resistance against specific subsets of servers, rather than any subset up to a certain size.
This notion bears some similarity to this work, since one may compel the vertices in these specific sets not to
induce a subgraph which infringes privacy in our scheme. However, the approach and the results of these works is
substantially different from ours, e.g., since [24] only discuss coded storage, and [13] discussed replication of the
entire dataset in every server, and disjoint colluding sets.
III. REPLICATION FACTOR TWO
A. A PIR protocol for 2-replication systems
In this section it is assumed that the replication factor is two, and that every two servers store at most one
file in common (see Remark 7), which results in a graph G = (V,E). The scheme applies for any field Fq with
at least three elements. Upon requiring file xφ, the user randomly chooses a vector α = (αi)
n
i=1 ∈ (F∗q)n, a
vector γ = (γi)
s
i=1 ∈ (F∗q)s, and an element h ∈ Fq \ {0, 1}, all uniformly at random, and defines
Q , diag(γ) · Iφ · diag(α),
where Iφ is obtained from I(G) by replacing the lower 1-entry in each column with −1, and then replacing
the 1-entry in column φ by h.
Let qj , the query for server j, be the j-th row of Q. Clearly, to upload this row we only need to send the
values of its nonzero entries, and hence the total upload complexity is 2n. Each node responds with aj = qj ·X,
and therefore the download complexity is sf , and the PIR rate is 1/s. Note that node j can calculate the inner
product since the support of qj contains only the indices of the files available to it. Upon receiving the information
from all s servers, the user has access to QX = diag(γ)Iφ diag(α)X. Then, by multiplying from the left by the
matrix diag(γ)−1 and by the all ones vector 1, the user get
1 · diag(γ)−1 diag(γ)Iφ diag(α)X = 1 · Iφ diag(α)X = (h− 1)αφxφ,
and hence xφ can be recovered. We proceed with studying the collusion resistance of the suggested scheme. The
following claim is a special case of a more general one that is given in the sequel (Theorem 4). Nevertheless, it is
given here in its current form to maintain simplicity and flow, and its proof is sketched.
Proposition 1. For any set of servers S ⊆ V such that GS does not contain a cycle, we have that I({qi}i∈S ;φ) = 0.
Proof sketch. To prove the claim, we analyze the submatrix of queries that is seen by S . For clarity, we omit zero
columns from this matrix, as well as columns of weight one, since the latter ones are obviously purely random, and
cannot cause leakage of information. Hence, the matrix we analyze is chosen according to the random variable QGS .
4The degree of a node in a graph is the number of edges that are incident with it.
5It is evident that every matrix which is chosen according to QGS has support which is identical to that of I(G)GS .
In what follows we explain why every |V (GS)| × |E(GS)| matrix M whose support is identical to that of I(G)GS
can be obtained by some choice of γ,α, and h with identical probability, regardless of the value of φ. Consequently,
this proves that no information regarding φ is leaked.
We calculate Pr(QGS = M) by an iterative process that follows a Breadth First Search (BFS) transversal
on GS . Pick an arbitrary vi ∈ S , and fix the value of the corresponding γi (with probability one). Clearly, it
follows that Pr(γi · αj · (Iφ)i,j = Mi,j) = (q − 1)−1 for every ej ∈ ΓGS (vi) regardless of whether or not (Iφ)i,j
is the entry of Iφ which is multiplied by h. Having the values of αj for every ej ∈ ΓGS (vi) fixed, we have
that Pr(γj′ ·αj · (Iφ)j′,j) = (q− 1)−1 for the same reasons, where vj′ is the other end of edge ej (again, regardless
of whether or not (Iφ)j′,j is the entry of Iφ which is multiplied by h). In other words, we have that fixing an entry
in γ which corresponds to some v ∈ V (GS) compels us to fix the values in α which correspond to all of ΓGS (v).
In turn, fixing these entries of α compels us to fix the values of γ at the other endpoints of the edges in ΓGS (v).
Since GS does not contain a cycle, we may proceed in a BFS fashion and have that every edge-node incidence
in GS reduces the overall probability of obtaining M by (q − 1)−1. Hence, every such matrix M is obtained with
probability (q−1)−|M |, where |M | is the size of the support of M , and regardless of the value of φ. Hence, perfect
privacy is guaranteed.
We now turn to study how gracefully the perfect privacy deteriorates if S contains one or more cycles, i.e., how
much of φ’s identity is revealed.
Proposition 2. For any cycle C = (V ′, E′) in G, any matrix M in the support of the random variable QC is
invertible if and only if eφ ∈ E′.
Proof. Let A , diag(γV ′)
−1M diag(αE′)
−1, and observe that rank(A) = rank(M). If φ /∈ E′, then each column
of A has two nonzero entries 1 and −1. Hence, 1 is in its left kernel, and thus rank(A) < c, where c , |V ′| =
|E′|. Moreover, it is an easy exercise to show that any set of c − 1 columns of A are linearly independent, and
hence rank(A) = c− 1.
On the other hand if φ ∈ E′, assume without loss of generality that A is of the form
A =


∗ h
∗ ∗
∗ . . .
. . . ∗
∗ −1

 ,
where ∗ denotes a nonzero entry. Then, detA = (−1)c−1h · detA1 − detA2, where A1 (resp. A2) is the bottom-
left (resp. top-left) (c − 1) × (c − 1) submatrix of A. Notice that detA1 is the product of all ∗-entries in the
sub-diagonal of A, and that detA2 is product of all ∗-entries in the main diagonal of A. Hence, since every pair
of ∗-entries in any given column are negations of one another, it follows that detA1 = (−1)c−1 detA2. Thus,
detA = (−1)2c−2h · detA2 − detA2 = (h− 1) detA2 6= 0.
Corollary 3. A set S ⊆ V such that GS contains cycles can narrow down the possible values of eφ (and hence,
of φ itself) to
T = T (S, φ) ,
(
ℓ⋂
k=1
E(Ck)
)
\
(
ℓ′⋃
k=1
E(C ′k)
)
, (1)
where C1, . . . , Cℓ are all cycles in GS that contain
5 eφ, and C
′
1, . . . , C
′
ℓ′ are all cycles in GS that do not contain eφ.
Proof. Let M be the matrix that is seen by S; chosen according to the random variable QGS . By Proposition 2,
the colluding servers can compute the rank of MC for every cycle C in their induced subgraph, and deduce
if eφ ∈ E(C) accordingly.
5For ℓ = 0 we formally define
⋂ℓ
k=1E(Ck) = E.
6We now show that Corollary 3 is in some sense the best that the colluding servers can hope for. Formally,
we show that conditioned by eφ ∈ T , all respective possible queries are obtained with identical probability. The
immediate conclusion is that out of the log n protected bits of φ, the information leakage if a set S collude is
precisely log n− log |T |; or, differently put, all files in T are equally likely.
To state the main theorem of this paper, whose proof is given in Appendix A, and of which Proposition 1 is
a special case, we require the following definition. For S ⊆ V and D ⊆ E, we say that a matrix in F|S|×|D|q
is (S,D)-compatible with G ((S,D)-compatible, for short) if its support coincides with that of I(G)S,D. This
definition extends naturally to a subgraph T ⊆ G where a matrix in F|V (T )|×|E(T )|q is said to be T -compatible if it
is (V (T ), E(T ))-compatible.
Theorem 4. For every subgraph T ⊆ G, the support of the random variable QT |φ is the set of all matrices A ∈
F
|V (T )|×|E(T )|
q such that:
(a) A is T -compatible with G; and
(b) for every cycle C ⊆ T ,
rank(AC) =
{
|E(C)| if φ ∈ E(C)
|E(C)| − 1 if φ /∈ E(C) .
Furthermore, the random variable QT |φ is uniformly distributed on its support.
First, it is evident that the case where T is acyclic in Theorem 4 proves Proposition 1. Second, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 5. For every set S ⊆ V and every two distinct values φ1, φ2 ∈ [n] such that φ2 ∈ T (S, φ1), the servers
in S cannot infer if φ = φ1 or φ = φ2.
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to prove that the random variables QGS |(φ = φ1) and QGS |(φ = φ2) are identical, i.e.,
the same queries are obtained with identical probabilities. Since both random variables are uniformly distributed
on their support by Theorem 4, it suffices to prove that their supports are identical. Also by Theorem 4, it suffices
to prove that the conditions (a) and (b) coincide in both cases. For (a) this claim is clear since it does not depend
on the value of φ. For condition (b), we need to prove that φ1 ∈ E(C) if and only if φ2 ∈ E(C) for every cycle C
in GS , which is precisely the meaning of φ2 ∈ T (S, φ1).
We now turn to present several choices of the graph G, and the resulting privacy of the PIR schemes. These
examples are summarized in Table I.
Example 6.
1) Taking G to be the Petersen graph (a 3-regular graph with 10 nodes, 15 edges, and girth 5) allows to store 15
files on 10 servers, 3 files on each, where any 4 servers cannot infer any information regarding φ. According
to the structure of the Petersen graph, at least 8 servers are required to infer the exact identity of φ. The
upload complexity is 30 field elements, and the download complexity is 10f field elements, i.e., the PIR rate
is 0.1.
2) Taking G = (L ∪ R,V) to be the complete bipartite graph, with n a square integer and |L| = |R| = √n,
allows to store n files on 2
√
n servers. To retrieve a file xφ, the user downloads 2
√
n · f field elements. The
resulting system ensures perfect privacy against all sets S ⊆ L∪R such that either |S∩L| ≤ 1 or |S∩R| ≤ 1,
and in particular, all sets of size three.
3) Graphs of large (constant) girth g are particularly useful since all sets with at most g−1 nodes are cycle-free,
and hence the resulting protocol is (g−1)-private. These can be obtained as incidence graphs of generalized
polygons [18, Table I], of which Item 2 above is a special case. In particular, for prime power q, there exist
explicit graphs with degree q + 1 with s ∈ {O(q2), O(q3), O(q5)} (and hence n ∈ {O(q3), O(q4), O(q6)}),
where g ∈ {6, 8, 12}, respectively. The respective download complexities are O(n2/3) · f , O(n3/4) · f ,
and O(n5/6) · f .
4) Let p ≥ 5 be a prime, and let m be a positive integer. The Murty graph [16] is a (pm + 2)-regular graph
with s = 2p2m nodes, n = p2m(pm + 2) edges, and girth five. In the resulting system, a database of n files
7n s t d PIR rate
Petersen 15 10 4 3 1
10
Complete bipartite Square 2
√
n 3
√
n 1
2
√
n
O(q3) O(q2) 5 q + 1 O(n−2/3)
O(q4) O(q3) 7 q + 1 O(n−3/4)Gen. polygons
O(q6) O(q5) 11 q + 1 O(n−5/6)
Murty p2m(pm + 2) 2p2m 4 pm + 2 O(n−2/3)
Ramanujan Any 2n
d
O(log n) Constant d
2n
TABLE I
DIFFERENT EXAMPLES FOR THE CHOICE OF G IN SECTION III. THE PARAMETER t STANDS FOR THE GUARANTEED t-PRIVACY OF THE
SYSTEM, AND d DENOTES THE FIXED DEGREE OF THE VERTICES IN THE GRAPH.
is stored on O(n2/3) servers, O(n1/3) files in each, and ensures perfect privacy against any four colluding
servers. To retrieve a file, a user downloads O(n2/3) · f field elements.
5) Ramanujan graphs (e.g., [15]) with n edges and constant degree have girth O(log n). Hence, the system is
resilient against any O(log n) colluding servers, but require download of δnf field elements for some δ ∈
(0, 1).
Remark 7. It is evident that the correctness of the scheme and its privacy guarantees hold also in cases where
there exist two servers that store more than one file in common. However, in the resulting multigraph, these two
servers form a cycle, and hence can collude to infer some information regarding the identity of xφ. On the one
hand, the system designer may choose to disperse the files while ignoring the aforementioned restriction in order
to increase the number of files in the system, at the price of diminishing its privacy guarantees. On the other hand,
if the system is designed such that every two servers store at most one file in common, it is clear that n ≤ (s2).
B. Bound
In this subsection we explore the limitations of PIR protocols for graph-based replication systems by proving
a bound on the PIR rate. The resulting bound is particularly powerful for the important family of regular graphs,
for which the bound is within a factor of two from the rate in Subsection III-A. We prove the bound for two-
replication systems that provide nontrivial privacy guarantees, namely, the system is at least two-private. In addition,
the maximum degree of a vertex in G is denoted by δ.
Lemma 8. In every two-private two-replication system the PIR rate is at most δn .
Proof. Let G be the induced graph, and let µi ≥ 0 be the fraction of f which is downloaded from server i by the
user. Clearly, it must be that µi + µj ≥ 1 for every edge {i, j} ∈ E(G), since otherwise, servers i and j can infer
that their mutual file is not required by the user, and hence the system is not two-private. Further, the PIR rate of
the system is (1s ·µ⊤)−1, where 1s is the all 1’s vector of length s and µ , (µ1, . . . , µs). Hence, an upper bound
on the PIR rate of the system is obtained from the optimal solution of the following linear program.
min 1s · µ⊤, subject to I(G)⊤µ⊤ ≥ 1n and µ ≥ 0, (2)
That is, the inverse of the optimum value of the objective function serves as an upper bound on the PIR rate of
the system. The following problem, which is called the dual of (2), η is a vector of n variables.
max 1n · η⊤, subject to I(G)η⊤ ≤ 1s and η ≥ 0. (3)
According to the primal-dual theory [7, Sec. 29.4], any solution which is feasible for (3) provides a lower bound
for (2). It is readily verified that η = 1δ ·1n is a feasible solution for (3), and the objective function for this solution
equals n/δ. Therefore, the PIR rate is bounded by δ/n.
In cases where G is a regular graph, which are particularly interesting since they induce systems with balanced
storage, the resulting bound equals δn =
2δ
sδ = 2/s. However, the possibility of a considerable rate improvement in
highly-unbalanced systems remains widely open.
8IV. ARBITRARY REPLICATION FACTORS
In this section we consider r-replication systems for r ≥ 2, which are favored in practice due to their greater
resilience to simultaneous failures [5, 12]. First, for any integer r ≥ 2, collusion resistance of r− 1 can be attained
by a simple scheme that is given in Subsection IV-A. Then, we provide another scheme in Subsection IV-B, which
guarantees larger collusion resistance by a reduction to the 2-replication case. The collusion resistance in the latter
case will strongly depend on our ability to increase the girth by removing edges from a certain multigraph. To
simplify the discussion, in this section we alleviate the requirement that every two servers share at most one file
in common.
A. Replication factor r and collusion resistance r − 1
The user begins by choosing a uniformly random matrix V ∈ Fr×nq , whose rows sum to eφ, the φ’th unit vector
of length n. Then, the user disperses the nr symbols of the matrix V to the queries {qi}si=1 arbitrarily6, such that
every server that stores a file xj receives a unique entry from the j’th column of V . In turn, the servers respond
with the respective linear combinations {aj = qj ·X}sj=1, and the user computes
∑s
i=1 ai = eφ ·X = xφ.
It is readily verified that every set of r − 1 servers can observe at most r − 1 entries in every column of V ,
which appear entirely random, and hence the resulting scheme is r − 1 private. Notice that there is no restriction
on the number of files that can be stored in this system, nor there is a restriction on their dispersion.
B. Arbitrary replication factor by reduction
In systems where files might be stored in more than two servers, one can obtain perfect privacy by “ignoring”
all but two copies of every file that is replicated more than twice, in a sense that will be made clear shortly,
and applying the scheme in Section III. Observe that choosing which copies to ignore may drastically affect the
collusion resistance of the system, since each choice produces a different graph with different cycles. Nevertheless,
this observation can in fact contribute to the security of the system by concealing the cycle structure of the resulting
graph from an adversary. In what follows we formalize these intuitions and discuss the different aspects of the
reduction to the 2-replication scheme.
Evidently, it is natural to consider an r-replication system for r ≥ 2 (or in fact, any replication system) as a
hypergraph, where each file corresponds to a hyperedge. Yet, for our purpose it is often more convenient to consider
it as a colored multigraph. That is, instead of considering every file as a hyperedge, which is incident with the nodes
that contain it, we consider a multigraph in which every edge carries a label (or a color) in [n]. Then, two servers
are connected by an edge with label i ∈ [n] if both of them contain a copy of xi. Clearly, given a hypergraph G,
one can easily create the respective colored multigraph Gˆ by replacing hyperedge i with a clique whose edges are
labelled by i. Notice that Gˆ can be a multigraph (i.e., contain parallel edges) since hyperedges can intersect in
more than one node. An illustration of these definitions is given in Figure 1, which also demonstrates the natural
notions of a monochromatic and polychromatic cycles, that will be useful in the sequel. In what follows we use G
and Gˆ interchangeably.
Given a replication system with a respective multigraph Gˆ, it is obvious that the user can choose any two copies
of every file, and apply the scheme from Section III while ignoring the remaining copies. Formally, for a server i
that stores a copy of xj that is chosen to be ignored by the user, the user simply transmits a zero coefficient for xj ,
or omits that coefficient altogether. Further, the operation of ignoring all but two copies of every file corresponds
to removing all but one of the edges of every color. Obviously, there are potentially many options to choose which
edge to keep for every label, and every such choice can be described by a function c : [n] → E(Gˆ) such that the
edge c(i) is labelled by i, for every i ∈ [n]. For any such c, let Gˆc be the result of keeping the edges {c(i)}i∈[n],
and removing the remaining ones. It is readily verified that the resulting scheme guarantees perfect privacy against
colluding sets that do not contain a cycle in Gˆc.
Clearly, if one can choose the file dispersion in the system as one pleases, then it is possible to first choose the
dispersion of only two copies of each file, so that the resulting graph G′ has a certain girth. Then, the remaining
copies can be dispersed arbitrarily, and the PIR scheme is performed with respect to the function c that c(i) ∈ E(G′)
6This is possible since
∑s
i=1 |qi| =
∑s
i=1 |Γ(i)| = rn, where |qi| is the length of qi.
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Fig. 1. A hypergraph G (in light blue) and its respective colored multigraph Gˆ (in dashed lines). The vertices {v1, v2, v5} contain a
monochromatic cycle, but not a polychromatic one. The vertices {v1, v4, v3, v2, v5} contain a monochromatic cycle, and a polychromatic
one.
for every i. However, if Gˆ is given to the user, finding a function c such that Gˆc has a large girth requires more
care.
For a given Gˆ one can choose c at random. In spite of not having any clear minimum girth guarantee, this approach
has the extra benefit of concealing the cycle structure from an adversary. For a given integer g, a function c such
that Gˆc has girth g, if exists, can be found be deciding the feasibility of the following {0, 1}-program. In this
program, for i ∈ [n] let Ei be the set of all 2-subsets {a, b} of [s] such that there exists an edge {a, b} labelled
by i.
• Objective: None.
• Variables: {xi,{a,b} | i ∈ [n] and {a, b} ∈ Ei}.
• Constraints:
–
∑
{a,b}∈Ei
xi,{a,b} = 1 for all i ∈ [n].
–
∑
i|{a,b}∈Ei
xi,{a,b} ≤ 1 for every {a, b} such that there exists at least one edge {a, b} in Gˆ.
–
∑
i|{a,b}∈Ei
xi,{a,b} +
∑
i|{b,c}∈Ei
xi,{b,c} +
∑
i|{c,a}∈Ei
xi,{c,a} ≤ 2, for every a, b, c ∈ [s] that contain at
least one triangle in Gˆ.
...
–
∑g
j=1
∑
i|{aj ,a(j+1) mod g∈Ei}
xi,{aj ,a(j+1) mod g} ≤ g − 1 for every a0, . . . , ag−1 ∈ [s] that contain at least
one g-cycle in Gˆ.
Clearly, the first set of constraints guarantees that exactly one edge is chosen for every file i ∈ [n]. The second
set of constraints guarantees that the resulting choice does not contain 2-cycles, the next set guarantees that there
are no triangles, and so on. Finally, we note that while solving this system for a general g is NP-hard, the special
case g = 2 reduces to finding a maximum matching in a bipartite graph, a problem that can be solved efficiently.
V. GRAPH-BASED CODING – REDUCING THE STORAGE OVERHEAD AT IMPROVED PIR RATES
This section discusses storage systems in which every file is similarly stored on a small number of servers, but
replication is generalized to arbitrary encoding. Hence, when employing an [N,K]q code with rate larger than 1/2
(i.e., K/N > 1/2), we obtain an improvement over previous schemes in terms of storage overhead. Furthermore, it
is shown that the resulting PIR rate is improved whenever N −K > 1. However, the (coded) file dispersion must
follow a certain structure, and the resulting collusion patterns are in correspondence with polychromatic cycles (see
Subsection IV-B and Figure 1), as will be explained next. Finally, we note that the scheme in this section is loosely
inspired by ideas from [11] and [14].
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Essentially, in the scheme of Section III, every file xi is coded by using a repetition code of length 2 over the
alphabet F
f
q . Then, every symbol of the resulting codeword is stored on a different server. The scheme which is
presented in this section generalizes this concept by employing codes other than the repetition code.
For integers N and K let G ∈ FK×Nq be a generator matrix of an [N,K]q MDS code D. Consider every
file xi as an (f/K) ×K matrix (x⊤i,1, . . . , x⊤i,K) over Fq, and let (x⊤i,1, . . . , x⊤i,K) · G , (y⊤i,1, . . . , y⊤i,N), where the
vectors {yi,j}Nj=1 are called the codeword symbols of xi. Let L1, . . . ,LN ⊆ [s] be disjoint nonempty subsets
whose union is [s] (and hence we must have N ≤ s). Then, for every i ∈ [n], disperse the N codeword
symbols yi,1, . . . , yi,N to the servers such that for every j ∈ [N ], the codeword symbol yi,j is in exactly one
server which belong to Lj . For example, one can think of a system in which the servers are partitioned to three
disjoint subsets; the servers in the first subset contain the first halves of all files, the servers in the second contain
the other half, and the servers in the third contain the sums of the two halves (see Example 11 and Example 12
which follow).
The above coding scheme gives rise to an N -uniform N -partite hypergraph in the following manner. Let [s]
be the set of vertices, and define hyperedges e1, . . . , en, such that ei contains all servers that store either one
of yi,1, . . . , yi,N . It is evident that the edges are of size N , and that the N parts of the hypergraph are the
sets L1, . . . ,LN . Let G be this hypergraph, and let Gˆ be its respective colored multigraph, as described in
Subsection IV-B.
We begin by presenting the PIR protocol for the special case N−K = K, and later extend it to other parameters
by operating in rounds. Begin by choosing α ∈ (F∗q)n,γ ∈ (F∗q)s, and h ∈ Fq \ {0, 1} uniformly at random, and
pick an arbitrary subset K ⊆ [N ] of size K. Then, for every m ∈ [N ], a server j ∈ [s] which belongs to Lm
receives the following query.
(qj)t =
{
γj · αt · hδ(t,m) if j contains a codeword symbol of xt
0 else
, (4)
where δ(t,m) is a Boolean indicator for the event “m ∈ K and t = φ”. Namely, the user transmits to server j the
part of the vector γj ·α that is relevant to it, where arbitrary K servers that store a codeword symbol of xφ are having
the φ’th entry of γj · α multiplied by h. In turn, a server j in Lm, which stores {yℓ,m|ℓ ∈ L} for some L ⊆ [n],
responds with aj ,
∑
ℓ∈L(qj)ℓ · yℓ,m. Having the responses {ai}si=1, the user composes the following matrix.
∑
j∈L1
γ−1j a
⊤
j , . . . ,
∑
j∈LN
γ−1j a
⊤
j

 = n∑
j=1
αj(y
⊤
j,1, . . . , y
⊤
j,N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Y
+ e,
where for m ∈ [N ], the m’th column of e is
(e)m =
{
αφ(h− 1)yφ,m if m ∈ K
0 else
.
Now, it is evident that every row in the matrix Y is a codeword in D, whose minimum distance is N −K + 1.
Therefore, since e has at mostK nonzero columns, and sinceK = N−K, a decoding algorithm7 for D can extract e
from the matrix that was composed by the user. At this point the user has obtained {yφ,m}m∈K, that are sufficiently
many codeword symbols of xφ in order to retrieve it. Therefore, the PIR rate of this scheme is
f
s·(f/K) =
K
s =
N−K
s .
The proof of privacy will be given after the general description.
Notice that in the above scheme, N − K codeword symbols of xφ are obtained, while K many of those are
sufficient to retrieve xφ. However, in cases where N −K < K, the scheme will not be successful, and in cases
where N −K > K, the resulting scheme will not be exploited to its full potential.
Therefore, to address cases in which K 6= N − K, we retrieve multiple files in rounds, a standard practice in
the PIR literature (e.g., [11, 14]). That is, we assume that the user wishes to download xφ1 , . . . , xφb privately for
some b ≥ 1, and the protocol operates in r ≥ 1 rounds. In each round, the user sends a query to every server, and
7Notice that the “error values” are in prescribed positions, and hence, an erasure correction algorithm suffices.
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receives responses from all servers. Specifically, we choose b and r so that Kb = r(N−K), i.e., r , LCM(K,N−K)N−K
and b , LCM(K,N−K)K . Prior to executing these rounds, the user fixes the following subsets of [N ]
J (1) = J (1,1) ∪ J (1,2) ∪ . . . ∪ J (1,b)
J (2) = J (2,1) ∪ J (2,2) ∪ . . . ∪ J (2,b)
...
J (r) = J (r,1) ∪ J (r,2) ∪ . . . ∪ J (r,b), (5)
such that in every row, the sets in the union are pairwise disjoint, such that |J (i)| = N −K for every i ∈ [r], and
such that | ∪si=1 J (i,j)| = K for every j ∈ [b]. Intuitively, for j ∈ [b] and i ∈ [r], the set J (j,i) contains the indices
of the codeword symbols of xφj that are retrieved during round i. The choice of such sets is easy, and is illustrated
in Appendix B.
In each round i the user executes the aforementioned protocol (for the case K = N −K), where J (i) is used in
lieu of the set K. That is, the queries are defined as in (4), with the difference that δ(t,m) is a Boolean indicator
for the event “there exists j ∈ [b] such that t = φj and m ∈ J (i,j)”. Having obtained the responses from all servers
in round i, the user computes
∑
j∈L1
γ−1j a
⊤
j , . . . ,
∑
j∈LN
γ−1j a
⊤
j

 = n∑
j=1
αj(y
⊤
j,1, . . . , y
⊤
j,N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Y
+ e′,
where for m ∈ [N ], the m’th column of e′ is
(e′)m =
{
αφj (h− 1)yφj ,m if m ∈ J (i,j)
0 else
.
Since |J (i)| = N −K, a decoding algorithm on the matrix Y can extract the values of e′. Hence, according to the
structures of the sets in (5), it follows that by the end of the r’th round, the user has obtained the K codeword
symbols {yφj ,m}m∈∪iJ(i,j) of xφj for every j ∈ [b], and hence all the files {xφj}bj=1 can be retrieved. The resulting
PIR rate is
bf
s · (f/K) · r = b ·
K
sr
=
r(N −K)
K
· K
sr
=
N −K
s
.
Remark 9. Roughly speaking, the scheme which is described in Section III is as a special case of the one in this
section, where K = 1, N = 2, and D , {(x,−x)|x ∈ Fq}, and the resulting rate is indeed N−Ks = 1s . However,
further simplification is possible for this particular choice of D, since the process of extracting the error vector e
reduces to multiplying by 1 from the left. Hence, the partitioning of the servers to subsets {Lj}Nj=1 is not required.
Proposition 10. A set S ⊆ V that contains no polychromatic cycles in Gˆ gains no information about φ1, . . . , φb.
Proof. For S that does not contain a polychromatic cycle, let R ⊆ [n] be the set of hyperedges in G that have two
or more vertices in S . Similar to Proposition 1, we analyze the matrix which is chosen according to the random
variable QS,R. Clearly, every matrix which is chosen according to QS,R is (S,R)-compatible with G, and we
show that the inverse is also true.
Let M ∈ F|S|×|R|q be a matrix which is (S,R)-compatible with G. Fix some vi ∈ S as the starting point
of the BFS algorithm, and choose an arbitrary value for γi (with probability 1). Once γi is fixed, it is evident
that Pr(γi · αj · hδ = Mi,j) = (q − 1)−1 for every hyperedge ej that is incident with vi regardless of the value
of the Boolean indicator δ. Notice that the only mutual element of these hyperedges is vi, since otherwise, a
polychromatic cycle of length two would exist in Gˆ. Therefore, once αj is fixed for such a hyperedge ej , we have
that Pr(γℓ · αj · hδ = Mℓ,j) = (q − 1)−1 for every ℓ such that vℓ ∈ ej ∩ R, again, regardless of δ. Proceeding in
a BFS fashion, we have that each node-hyperedge incidence reduces the overall probability of obtaining M by a
multiplicative factor of (q− 1)−1. Since S does not contain a polychromatic cycle, no discrepancy is encountered,
which concludes the proof.
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Example 11. Consider s = 12, and let D be the parity code {(x, y, x+y)|x, y ∈ Fq}, and hence N = 3 and K = 2.
Also, let L1 = {1, . . . , 4}, L2 = {5, . . . , 8}, and L3 = {9, . . . , 12}. Consider the following 16 hyperedges.
{1, 5, 9} {2, 5, 10} {3, 5, 11} {4, 5, 12}
{1, 6, 10} {2, 6, 11} {3, 6, 12} {4, 6, 9}
{1, 7, 11} {2, 7, 12} {3, 7, 9} {4, 7, 10}
{1, 8, 12} {2, 8, 9} {3, 8, 10} {4, 8, 11}
It is readily verified that every two distinct edges intersect in at most one node, and hence, there are no polychromatic
cycles of length 2. The resulting system is 2-private, has storage overhead 1.5, and its PIR rate is 1/12.
Example 12. Generalizing the previous example, let s be any integer divisible by 3, let D be the parity code,
and let L1 = {1, . . . , s/3}, L2 = {s/3 + 1, . . . , 2s/3}, and L3 = {2s/3 + 1, . . . , s}. Let M1, . . . ,Ms/3 be edge-
disjoint maximum matchings8 in a complete bipartite graph H whose one side is L2, and the other is L3. Notice
that |Mi| = s/3 for every i, and consider the following hyperedges.
{{1, a, b}|{a, b} ∈ M1} {{2, a, b}|{a, b} ∈ M2} . . .
{{s/3, a, b}|{a, b} ∈ Ms/3}
We claim that any two of the above hyperedges intersect in at most one node. Assuming otherwise we have
|{a1, a2, a3}∩{b1, b2, b3}| = 2 for some integers ai and bi. If a1 = b1, it follows that the edges {a2, a3} and {b2, b3}
in H share a vertex, even though they both belong to Ma1 , a contradiction. If a1 6= b1, it follows that the
matchings Ma1 and Mb1 both contain the edge {a2, a3} = {b2, b3}, another contradiction.
Therefore, the resulting system is 2-private, accommodates n = s2/9 files, incurs storage overhead of 1.5, and
has PIR rate of 1/s. For comparison, considering the full graph on s nodes and applying the scheme in Section III
provides a 2-private system with n = (s2 + s)/2 files, storage overhead 2, and comparable PIR rate 1/s.
VI. DISCUSSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this paper we initiated a study of private information retrieval for a specific storage model that is widely used
in practice, and widely studied in theoretical research. In order to improve our understanding of this model, and in
order to improve its applicability to real-world systems, we suggest the following research directions.
1) Close the gap between achievable PIR rate in Subsection III-A and the upper bound in Subsection III-B.
2) Improve the collusion resilience in systems with arbitrary replication factors.
3) Construct families of dense graphs in which T (S, φ) (1) is large for every S ⊆ [s] and every φ.
4) Study graceful degradation for replication factors larger than two.
5) Find PIR schemes for 2-replication systems that guarantee collusion resistance against cycles, and are non-
trivial (i.e., download less than the entire dataset).
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
The proof of Theorem 4 requires two auxiliary lemmas (Lemma 13 and Lemma 14), and then is proved in two
parts (Lemma 15 and Lemma 16).
Lemma 13. Let C ⊆ G be a cycle with c edges, and let M ∈ Fc×(c−1)q be a matrix which is (V (C), E(C) \ {j})-
compatible, where j is the maximum index of an edge in E(C). Then, there exist precisely q − 1 vectors a ∈ Fcq
such that M ′ , (M |a) ∈ Fc×cq is (V (C), E(C))-compatible and rank(M ′) = c− 1.
Proof. First, observe that since C \{j} is a tree, and since M is (V (C), E(C)\{j})-compatible with G, it follows
that rankM = c− 1. Hence, the added vector a must be in colspan(M), i.e.,
a =
∑
k∈E(C)\{j}
mkck, (6)
where the ck’s are the columns of M and the mk’s are coefficients from Fq. Furthermore, since M
′ must be
compatible with G, the column a must contain nonzero entries precisely in row i1 and row i2, that correspond to
the two vertices incident with edge j. Hence, since each row k ∈ V (C) \ {i1, i2} of M contains precisely two
nonzero entries in some columns k1 and k2, it follows that intersecting the column span of M with Nk , {x =
(xi)
c
i=1 ∈ Fcq|xk = 0} reduces the degrees of freedom in (6) by 1, since it renders any one of {mk1 ,mk2} to be a
linear function of the other. Therefore,
dim (X) = (c− 1)− (c− 2) = 1, where
X , colspan(M)
⋂ ⋂
k∈V (C)\{i1,i2}
Nk

 .
Since any nonzero vector in X is a suitable candidate for a, the claim follows.
Lemma 14. If an edge e ∈ E(G) is on a cycle in G, then there exists a BFS ordering of E(G) for which e is a
back edge.
Proof. Denote eφ = {vf , vg} and choose vd ∈ V (G) which maximizes dist(vg, vd), where distance between two
vertices is defined as the number of edges in the shortest path between them. Without loss of generality, assume
that dist(vg, vd) ≥ dist(vf , vd), and consider a BFS run which begins at vd. Partition V (G) to layers L1, L2, . . .
according to their distance from vd, and recall that edges inside each layer are always back edges. Hence, if eφ is
inside a layer, we are done. Otherwise, assume that vf is in Li for some i, and hence vg is in Li+1. Since eφ is
on a cycle, there exists another edge e′ from a node v′ ∈ Li to vg. Hence, in cases where v′ pops out of the queue
before vf , eφ will indeed be a back edge. It is readily verified that the order of insertion of discovered vertices in
the same layer is arbitrary, and hence there exists a BFS run in which v′ predates vf , and the claim follows.
We now turn to prove Theorem 4 in two parts.
Lemma 15. For every subgraph T ⊆ G, the support of the random variable QT |φ is the set of all matrices A ∈
F
|V (T )|×|E(T )|
q such that:
(a) A is T -compatible with G; and
(b) for every cycle C ⊆ T
rank(AC) =
{
|E(C)| if φ ∈ E(C)
|E(C)| − 1 if φ /∈ E(C) .
Proof. For simplicity assume that 2|q, but other cases can be proved similarly. By the definition of QT |φ, it is
evident that (a) is necessary, and according to Proposition 2, it follows that (b) is necessary. In what follows, it is
shown that (a) and (b) are also sufficient. To this end, let A ∈ F|V (T )|×|E(T )|q be a matrix which satisfies (a) and
(b), and it is shown that there exists a choice of α,γ, and h for which QT |φ produces A.
Consider a BFS run on T , and number V (T ) and E(T ) according to their discovery times. That is, let v1, . . . , v|V (T )|
be the vertices of T sorted by their discovery times, and let e1, . . . , e|E(T )| be the edges of T sorted by their discovery
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times. Also, assume that if eφ ∈ E(T ), and eφ closes a cycle, then it is a back edge (see Lemma 14). The values
of α,γ, and h which produce A are determined according to this BFS ordering, as follows.
First, fix an arbitrary value in F∗q for γ1. Then, since v1 is incident with the edges e1, . . . , e|Γ(v1)|, we fix the
values of α1, . . . , α|Γ(v1)| as αi , Av1,ei/γ1, i ∈ {1, . . . , |Γ(v1)|}. Then, for v2, . . . , v|Γ(v1)|+1, that are the end
vertices of e1, . . . , e|Γ(v1)|, respectively, we fix γi = Avi,ei−1/αi−1, i ∈ {2, . . . , |Γ(v1)|+1}. If eφ is not on a cycle
in T , and eφ happens to be, say, e1, then we can obviously choose α2 , Av2,e1/(γ1 · h), where h is arbitrary (the
case where eφ lies on a cycle is treated in the sequel). Clearly, this process goes on unhindered as long as a back
edge is not discovered.
Once a back edge eb = {vc, vd}, b 6= φ is discovered, we have that γc, γd were already determined in earlier
stages of the algorithm. Hence, we ought to show that there exists αb for which
αb =
Avc,eb
γc
, and αb =
Avd,eb
γd
. (7)
To this end, let C be a cycle which is discovered in whole when eb is discovered and let c be its number of edges.
Further, let M , AC\{eb}, i.e., the partial matrix of A which corresponds to the subgraph C \ {eb}. Similarly,
let N , diag(γV (C))I
C\{eb} diag(αE(C)\{eb}) be the matrix which corresponds to the choice of entries in γ
and α up until eb is discovered. By the correctness of the algorithm so far, it follows that M = N . Moreover,
both M and N are (V (C), E(C)\{j})-compatible, and by the definition of A, the submatrix AC is C-compatible,
and its rank is c − 1. According to Lemma 13 there exist precisely (q − 1) columns c1, . . . , cq−1 that extend M
(and also N ) to a C-compatible matrix of rank c − 1, one of which is AC . Further, it is evident that the matrix
diag(γV (C))I
C diag(αE(C)), for any of the (q−1) possible values of αb ∈ F∗q , results in a C-compatible matrix of
rank c−1 as well. Therefore, there exists a 1-1 correspondence between the possible values of αb and c1, . . . , cq−1.
Since one of c1, . . . , cq−1 is the actual eb’th column of A
C , it follows that there exists a unique value of αb ∈ F∗q
which satisfies (7).
If eφ lies on a cycle C
′ in T , we denote eφ , {vf , vg}. Since eφ is a back edge, we have that γg and γf were
determined in earlier steps of the algorithm. Hence, we must find αφ ∈ F∗q and h ∈ Fq \ {0, 1} for which
hγgαφ = Avg ,eφ (8)
γfαφ = Avf ,eφ .. (9)
Clearly, the choice αφ , Avf ,eφ/γf satisfies (9), and consequently, h ,
Avg,eφ
γgαφ
satisfies (8). We are only left to
show that this value for h is neither 0 nor 1. First, it is obviously nonzero as a product of nonzero terms. Second,
if h = 1 happens to be the answer, we have by Proposition 2 that AC
′
is rank-deficient, in contradiction with
condition (b).
Lemma 16. For every T ⊆ G, the random variable QT |φ is uniformly distributed on its support.
Proof. Let A be a matrix in the support of QT |φ. By following the proof of Lemma 15, we have that once γ1 is
fixed, and as long as a back edge is not discovered, every edge-node incidence reduces the overall probability of
obtaining A by (q − 1)−1. In addition, every back edge which is not eφ reduces the probability of obtaining A
by (q− 1)−1 due to (7), instead of by (q− 1)−2 for tree edges9. Finally, if eφ lies on a cycle, it reduces the overall
probability by 1q−1 due to (9) and by
1
q−2 due to (8). Therefore, we have the following, where u denotes the number
of edge-node incidences in T , and k denotes the number of back edges in a BFS run (which is identical in every
run of a BFS algorithm).
• If eφ is not on a cycle in T then Pr((Q
T |φ) = A) =
(
1
q−1
)u−k
.
• If eφ is on a cycle in T then Pr((Q
T |φ) = A) =
(
1
q−1
)u−k
· 1q−2 .
APPENDIX B
CHOICE OF SETS
The process of choosing the sets {J (j,i)}(j,i)∈[r]×[b] in (5) is very simple, and is best illustrated by the following
examples.
9An edge which is not a back edge in a BFS ordering is called a tree edge.
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Example 17. Assume that N −K = 4 and K = 6, which implies that r = 3 and b = 2. Consider the following
matrix 
1 1 1 12 2 1 1
2 2 2 2

 ,
which naturally corresponds to the sets
J (1,1) = {1, 2, 3, 4} J (1,2) = ∅
J (2,1) = {5, 6} J (2,2) = {1, 2}
J (3,1) = ∅ J (3,2) = {3, 4, 5, 6}.
As another example, in which N −K ≥ K, we may consider the following.
Example 18. Assume that N −K = 6 and K = 4, which implies that r = 2 and b = 3. Consider the following
matrix (
1 1 1 1 2 2
2 2 3 3 3 3
)
which naturally corresponds to the sets
J (1,1) = {1, 2, 3, 4} J (2,1) = ∅
J (1,2) = {5, 6} J (2,2) = {1, 2}
J (1,3) = ∅ J (2,3) = {3, 4, 5, 6}.
